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I. Introduction
We are pleased to respond to the “Questions for Public Comment” (“QFPCs”) posed by
the FTC and DOJ (“Agencies”) on September 22, 2009. It has been more than a decade
since the Merger Guidelines’ Efficiencies section has been updated and 17 years since the
section on Competitive Effects has been revised. Economics analysis of mergers has
progressed substantially since that time, and merger law has continued to evolve.
Lawyers and economists with a regular antitrust practice may not require an update in
light of their knowledge of the 2006 Merger Commentary, speeches and Agency
experience. But, the rest of the antitrust world does. For example, it is important to keep
the courts abreast of what the Agencies believe is “best practice,” based on the Agencies’
review of hundreds of mergers each year. Moreover, as FTC Commissioner William
Kovacic has stressed in speeches, the world marketplace for antitrust ideas needs to have
the guidance of the US enforcement agencies. They should not have to ferret it out from
commentaries and speeches. The Merger Guidelines have been the most emulated
feature of US antitrust enforcement worldwide. It would be unfortunate to squander the
leadership role by a failure to stay up-to-date or a failure to keep the world informed.
Many of the QFPCs are highly interrelated. Therefore, rather than attempting to answer
the questions one at a time, we will discuss certain issues that hopefully will throw light
on a number of the questions. Our comments here also will not attempt to touch on every
issue or respond to every question raised in the notice.
The remainder of this submission is organized as follows: Section II discusses issues
related to the goals of merger analysis. It also introduces the issue of imperfect
information and the role of presumptions. Section III focuses on market definition.
Section IV focuses on unilateral effects analysis, including the possible role of price
pressure indices (“PPIs”). Section V provides some brief comments on coordinated
effects. Section VI provides some brief comments on efficiencies.
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II. The Goals and Structure of Merger Analysis
We believe there is substantial consensus about the economic goal of merger analysis
under the Merger Guidelines. That goal is to identify mergers that have a substantial
likelihood of reducing competition, relative to an appropriate benchmark. However,
beyond this general goal, there is more controversy and confusion about the proper scope
of the analysis. There also is potential controversy regarding the exact goals of merger
enforcement, as opposed to simply merger analysis. We want to begin with some
comments on these issues.
A. Competitive Effects Generally
The central focus of merger analysis involves competitive effects, that is, predicting the
likelihood that a merger will reduce competition. The components of this analysis set out
in the current Merger Guidelines – market definition; identification of market
participants; calculation of market shares and concentration; evaluation of potentially
adverse competitive effects; ease of entry; efficiencies; failing firm – are just the means
of evaluating the likely competitive effects of the merger. In particular, market share and
concentration statistics are one type of circumstantial evidence for predicting the likely
competitive effects. They are not the only type of evidence or even necessarily the best
evidence. For example, evidence from “natural experiments” (such as the pricing
evidence discussed in Staples) might provide far more compelling evidence of likely
competitive effects than the inference that could be drawn from market shares. This may
be true for both high and low market shares. A longer overview on these issues may be
warranted in the Guidelines Update.
B. Exclusionary Conduct
The Merger Guidelines discuss two types of adverse competitive effects – coordinated
effects and unilateral effects. Merger analysis focuses on the ability of a firm or group of
firms to maintain or raise price (or reduce quality, etc) to an anticompetitive level in the
post-merger marketplace. The Merger Guidelines fail to recognize explicitly that an
additional route to achieving, maintaining or enhancing market power in the post-merger
world would be to raise the costs of competitors and/or entry barriers, for example, by
inducing input suppliers (possibly including distributors) to act in ways to disadvantage
those competitors.2 These cost increases could facilitate adverse coordinated and/or
unilateral effects. This may be a significant issue for some mergers. This analysis also
explains why and when competitor complaints can be consistent with consumer harm.
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This outcome might occur if one of the merging parties is vertically integrated. It also might occur if the
merging firm will be large enough to be a “power buyer” that can pressure upstream suppliers. For more
details on a possible analytic framework, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986); Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 699 (2005).
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This latter point is significant because some commentators and courts erroneously infer
that competitor complaints are a signal that the merger is procompetitive.3
C. Maintaining Market Power
The Merger Guidelines state that the “unifying theme” is that mergers “should not be
permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise.” §0.1. This
statement omits the idea that mergers also should not be permitted to allow the
“maintenance” of market power. This does not appear to be simply careless drafting in
an otherwise very carefully crafted document.4 Instead, it appears to represent a policy
choice that pre-merger market power is “grandfathered,” and the only relevant policy
concern is to ensure that mergers will not “enhance” market power. This issue is
exhibited explicitly in the use of the “prevailing price” as the starting point for the
hypothetical monopolist ssnip test. This methodology also can fall victim to the famous
Cellophane Fallacy. Both these issues are discussed below.
D. Optimal Deterrence
As part of its determination of its enforcement decisions, including the “safe harbor” and
“presumptively anticompetitive” thresholds for the Guidelines Update, it would be useful
for the Agencies to consider the impact of its standards on deterrence and the optimal
balancing of the likelihood and magnitude of harms from false positives and false
negatives. This is not a novel idea. The current Merger Guidelines refer to these issues
at the end of §0.1.
Analysis of a particular merger is designed to identify the likelihood that a particular
merger will lead to anticompetitive effects. Because merger analysis takes place with
limited information in a short time frame, there always are concerns about “false
positives” and “false negatives.” False negatives include anticompetitive transactions
that are not identified, anticompetitive transactions that are identified but not enjoined by
the courts, and transactions where the remedy is insufficient. False positives include
procompetitive or competitively neutral (but socially beneficial) mergers that are
enjoined or abandoned as a result of Agency enforcement actions.
This imperfect information also affects the rates of deterrence. In analyzing optimal
deterrence, one would include in the false positives column the potential for
procompetitive (or competitively neutral but socially beneficial) mergers to be deterred
3

Judge Posner’s HCA opinion is one example of this reasoning. Hospital Corporation of America v.
F.T.C., 807 F.2d 1381, 1391-92 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The hospital that complained to the Commission must
have thought that the acquisitions would lead to lower rather than higher prices – which would benefit
consumers, and hence . . . support the view that the acquisitions were lawful.”).
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There also is the issue of mergers that can reduce or eliminate potential competition. Enforcement in
this areas has fallen into disuse over time, despite its importance in high tech markets where market
structure in the future can be substantially affected by mergers that take place before products actually are
introduced into the market. The Agencies should consider policies to revitalize and clarify its enforcement
intentions regarding mergers that affect potential competition.
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by fear of enforcement actions. It also might include recognition of possible benefits of
maintaining well-functioning markets for property rights. A full analysis of deterrence
also would take into account the costs and potential errors in enforcement, including the
idea that an over-burdened staff might overlook some anticompetitive mergers or attempt
to block procompetitive ones with insufficient evidence.
Deterrrence analysis also would take into account the costs inflicted on merging firms
and the potential harmful effects of deterring procompetitive mergers by risk-averse
firms. Deterrence analysis also would include anticompetitive mergers that are attempted
and then identified, but inflict administrative costs on the Agencies and the courts.
Deterrence analysis is complex. Intuition might suggest that false positives would lead to
over-deterrence and false negatives would lead to under-deterrence. That is true, but it
overlooks another very important element: error generally leads to under-deterrence. To
illustrate with an extreme example, suppose that the state trooper’s radar gun is imperfect
so that a driver is equally likely to be ticketed whether going 20 mph under the speed
limit or 20 mph over the limit or anywhere in-between. In that case, the likelihood of
conviction is not related to the driver’s conduct. The driver might as well exceed the
speed limit. After all, the speed does not affect the likelihood of being held liable for
speeding and going 20 mph below the speed limit might make the driver late for an
important meeting. Given these circumstances, why bother slowing down? As a result,
there would be under-deterrence.
The concept of “incipiency” also relates directly to optimal deterrence. Incipiency was
interpreted in the past in terms of stopping a trend towards concentration. But, a more
salient interpretation of incipiency in a modern decision-theoretic analysis might be that
the Congress premised Section 7 on the view that false negatives (and under-deterrence)
are a more serious concern than false positives (and over-deterrence).5 The Agencies
should clarify the role of this balancing in setting out its enforcement intentions.
Retrospective evaluation of proposed transactions that were permitted, abandoned or
remedied can provide the Agencies with some information on whether there has been a
bias towards false negatives or false positives with respect to those transactions.6
Retrospective analysis of permitted mergers obviously also would be a rich source of
information. There is also an issue of whether the assumptions underlying the Merger
Guidelines need revision. One possible issue involves the magnitude of the presumption
of general efficiency benefits (as distinct from cognizable efficiency benefits established
5

By way of comparison, the courts today seem to treat false negatives as the more serious problem in the
case of joint pricing (i.e., price fixing), and false positives as the more serious problem for certain unilateral
pricing conduct (e.g., predatory pricing and unconditional refusals to deal).
6

For example, a likelihood of significant false negatives might be inferred from the number of
transactions that are abandoned after issuance of a second request. Assuming that those firms had been
well counseled, one might wonder whether a number of these were likely anticompetitive transactions that
nonetheless were attempted in the expectation of a significant likelihood that they would slip though the
Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) process without being identified. (It also might be interesting to track this
statistic over time.)
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for a particular merger). As discussed below, some economic scholarship might be read
to suggest that mergers are not as driven by efficiencies as seems to have been assumed
in the 1980s.7
Deterrence is not just affected by the substantive merger standard. It also is affected by
aspects of the merger enforcement process. The most obvious issue is the agency
enforcement decision threshold, that is, the minimum expected probability of winning in
court that the Agencies’ management require in order to justify going to court. Looking
over the past 30 years, the previous conventional wisdom was that the Agencies (and
Agency lawyers) were overly aggressive. Today, the situation may have become
reversed, with the Agencies being highly risk averse about bringing cases.
Commentators sometimes look at the won-loss record to evaluate aggressiveness. But, it
is well-known from the law and economics literature that the won-loss rate is mostly
determined by settlement behavior and uncertainty that deters litigation in all but the
hardest cases when the stakes are symmetric and biases the won-loss record when the
stakes, litigation costs and degree of risk aversion are asymmetric.8 In that sense, the
agencies and commentators may be paying too much attention to won-loss rates.
Settlement procedures also are relevant to deterrence. For example, a strict requirement
of fix-it-first with no subsequent settlement negotiations likely would increase the degree
of deterrence.
Deterrence also would be affected by the remedial standard. One remedial standard
might be to enjoin all incremental elements of a transaction that are incrementally
welfare-reducing. A more permissive remedial standard would require divestitures
sufficient only to prevent overall consumer harm from the merger (rather than lead to
consumer benefit).9 This latter standard might lead to insufficient deterrence. With this
latter standard, merging firms could safely expand the transaction to include certain
anticompetitive elements, as long as they did not go far as to make the entire transaction
consumer welfare-reducing. Coupled with a likelihood that some anticompetitive deals
would slip through would yield a negative expected welfare effect on average. This
raises the question of whether the agencies use this lower remedial standard or whether
they actually parse all the elements of the transaction to ensure that it maximizes
consumer welfare, or somewhere in between.

7

For example, see Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 235, 256 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
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For example, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984), and the literature generated by their article.
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To illustrate, consider the following abstract example. Suppose that a divestiture of X% of an
overlapping product line in the relevant market would prevent the merger from causing consumer harm
(relative to the pre-merger situation), but a divestiture of Y%>X% of the overlapping product line would
maximize consumer welfare. In this sense, the part of the merger that involves the (Y-X)% increment in
the merger reduces consumer welfare at the margin. Requiring the divestiture of Y% instead of X% would
increase consumer welfare at the margin.
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While these issues have not been made explicit in the Merger Guidelines, liability and
remedial standards should be interrelated. For example, if the merger remedy process is
weak, then tougher substantive standards would be required to achieve optimal
deterrence, or vice versa. Thus, analysis of these issues and the potential reforms should
be considered as part of the Update process.
E. Imperfect Information and Relevant Market Definition
The QFPCs ask for comments about the hypothetical monopolist ssnip test. In our view,
that test is an elegant but complicated and imperfect methodology. The QFPCs (and our
comments here) provide a list of potential criticisms. Other commentators no doubt will
offer additional criticisms. However these criticisms are resolved in the Guidelines
Update, these criticisms add up to an important theme: market definition will often yield
ambiguous results. It might make sense to explicitly concede this point in the Guidelines
Update.
That is, the Guidelines Update could recognize that market definition is an imperfect
exercise in which the “most appropriate” market definition is sometimes unclear. There
may not be convincing evidence for a unique “most appropriate” market, as opposed to a
substantial “likelihood” that one or another market definition is appropriate.10 The
concession of this point would nudge both the Merger Guidelines and the law to focus
more solidly on the bottom line issue of likely competitive effects. Of course, the
decision to downgrade the role of concentration and market shares cuts both ways. On
the one hand, it obviously would weaken the Philadelphia National Bank (“PNB”)
structural presumption of harm. On the other hand, it may not be recognized that it also
would weaken the case for safe harbors based on market share and concentration.
We are not suggesting that market definition be excised from merger analysis. Section 7
of the Clayton Act requires one or more lines of commerce and sections of the country to
be defined. Market shares and concentration also retain relevance for predicting
competitive effects. But, we expect that there is a virtual consensus that market shares
and concentration (the results of market definition) are mainly valued for helping to
analyze competitive effects, not as an end in and of itself. This recognition should be
made explicit in the Guidelines Update.
We discuss market definition analysis in more detail in Section III below.
F. Initial Screens, Safe Harbors and Structural Presumptions
This discussion of possibly downgrading the importance of market shares and
concentration (and thus rendering the market definition chosen less of a do-or-die
determination) raises the issue of the four distinct ways in which market share and
concentration are used in the merger enforcement process. (Of course, other factors such
10

On this point, see Michael Katz & Howard Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the Treatment of
Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (2007).
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as the UPP test or the GUPPI measure discussed below also could be used in these four
ways, as discussed in Section IV.)
First, PNB and subsequent cases discuss the role of market share and concentration in
forming a legal presumption that a transaction is anticompetitive, that is, a rebuttable
presumption that shifts the burden to the merging parties to explain why the merger is not
anticompetitive.
Second, the Merger Guidelines use market shares and concentration for setting the
enforcement threshold for identifying mergers as presumptively non-harmful, including
irrebuttable (or virtually irrebuttable) safe harbors.
Third, the Merger Guidelines use market shares and concentration for setting the
threshold for identifying mergers as presumptively anticompetitive, that is, mergers that
will lead to an enforcement action if not rebutted by exculpatory evidence provided by
the merging parties. This enforcement presumption is different from the PNB legal
presumption because it involves only the Agencies’ enforcement decision.11 (As
discussed in Section IV below, when there is a sliding scale, there could be multiple
levels of enforcement presumptions, with different burdens placed on the Agencies and
the merging parties.)
Fourth, the Merger Guidelines and the courts use market shares and concentration as one
type of probative circumstantial evidence for determining the likelihood of adverse
competitive effects. In this regard, there is other circumstantial evidence and also the
potential for direct evidence, and the non-market share evidence may be more
compelling.
In the 1992 Merger Guidelines, there are two safe harbors, HHI<1000 and HHI<1800/
ΔHHI<100. (However, the safe harbors are not absolute; the Guidelines state only that
“ordinarily” such mergers require no further analysis. §1.51.) The threshold for a
“presumptively anticompetitive” transaction involves HHI>1800/ΔHHI>100. For
unilateral effects, a combined market share of the merging firms of less than 35% might
be a safe harbor, or a market share exceeding 35% might be considered presumptively
anticompetitive, or neither; no one can really tell from reading the current Merger
Guidelines at §2.211.
It appears that the Agencies’ de facto safe harbor in the previous administration was an
HHI significantly exceeding 1800. Some leading practitioners have suggested informally
that the threshold for identifying a merger as presumptively anticompetitive was either 4to-3 or perhaps even 3-to-2 (plus a fringe of much smaller companies), though we are
sure that there could be debate on that issue.12
11

Of course, the legal presumption and the enforcement presumption are related and could converge over
time.
12

For the review of some data from the 2001-2005 period, see Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic &
Jonathan B. Baker, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE (2nd Edition) 516 (2002).
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It is clear that the legal presumption based on market share/concentration has been
dramatically weakened over time. In Baker-Hughes, for example, future Supreme Court
Justices Thomas and Ginsburg characterized concentration as nothing more than a
“convenient starting point” for merger analysis.13 If there is a structural presumption
today, it certainly is much higher than the approximately 35% combined market share in
PNB. In Heinz,14 the D.C. Circuit applied a strong presumption to a combined share of
35%, but that involved what the appeals court saw as essentially a 3-to-2 merger.
We assume that part of the Guidelines Update will be to revise the safe harbor and
“presumptively anticompetitive” enforcement thresholds. In this regard, there obviously
is no reason why either the safe harbors or the structural presumption must be solely
based on market shares and concentration, rather than other variables. We assume that
the Guidelines Update may formulate thresholds for unilateral effects concerns that are
based on price pressure indices (“PPIs”) – either to supplement or to replace the HHI and
market share thresholds in the 1992 Merger Guidelines. Perhaps a safe harbor based on
ease of entry also will be added explicitly. Economic analysis by Farrell & Shapiro15 of
their UPP test (and earlier articles by Werden,16 O’Brien & Salop,17 and others) suggests
the relevance of using a PPI for mergers that raise unilateral effects concerns.18 We will
discuss these PPIs in more detail in Section IV.

III. The Hypothetical Monopolist SSNIP Test for Market Definition
As mentioned above, the hypothetical monopolist ssnip test is an elegant but complicated
and imperfect methodology. The design and/or implementation of the ssnip test

13

United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (1990).

14

FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716-17 (2001). We were economic consultants to the merging
parties for this transaction.
15

Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to
Market Definition, Working Paper, 25 November 2008 (UC Berkeley Dept. of Econ.), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/alternative.pdf.
16

Gregory Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of
Differentiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409 (1996).

17

Daniel O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and
Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (2000).
18

Werden calculates the compensating marginal cost reductions (“CMCRs”) for the merging products that
would ensure that prices would not change post-merger. The CMCRs are PPIs in the sense that higher
values of the CMCRs indicate larger potential unilateral effects (in the absence of efficiencies, repositioning
and entry). Farrell & Shapiro propose an upward pricing pressure (“UPP”) test for each of the merging
products. The UPP test is a binary PPI that indicates whether the price of a product is subject to upward or
downward pressure (in the absence of repositioning and entry, but accounting for an “efficiency credit”).
O’Brien & Salop propose a PPI for each of the merging products that under certain conditions measures
the magnitude of the potential unilateral effects (again, in the absence of efficiencies, repositioning and
entry).
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definitely need some renovation after all these years. In this section, we will discuss
several areas where some updating would be helpful.
A. Smallest Market Principle
The “smallest market principle” (“SMP”) clearly should be erased. First, the SMP
erroneously suggests that a careful application of the ssnip test will identify one and only
one relevant market (for each product sold by the merging parties). That outcome is not
the case in practice. The Guidelines counsel the analyst to begin with one of the products
of one of the merging firms. Even if each of the merging firms produces a single brand
of a single product, the separate starting points (one for each firm) and the ssnip
algorithm often may lead to two separate “smallest” markets. The situation is even worse
once non-uniform price increases are considered. The ssnip test permits the analyst to
evaluate a uniform price increase or a price increase only for some products within the
proposed market. Depending on the pricing assumption, a different smallest market may
emerge. Finally, the Merger Guidelines envision the possibility of price discrimination
markets, whereby prices are increased only to certain customers or groups of customers.
This pricing assumption could lead to a yet different smallest market.
Second, in combination with the algorithm for expanding the candidate market, the SMP
also can significantly distort the analytic process. When an iteration of the ssnip test
finds that the ssnip would be unprofitable, the Merger Guidelines direct the analyst to
“add to the product group the product that is the next-best substitute for the merging
firm's product.” §1.11. The identification of the next-best substitute can make a huge
difference to the outcome of the market definition algorithm. For example, suppose that
pens vary along a price/quality continuum. Consider a merger involving a mid-level pen
brand. On the one hand, if the very next-best substitute is a lower price/quality brand, the
algorithm may drive the market definition to a “low end” pen market. On the other hand,
if the very next-best substitute is a higher price/quality brand, the algorithm may drive the
market definition to a “high end” pen market. Which brand of pen is the very next-best
substitute clearly could be a very close call. Yet, this decision could make a huge
difference if the algorithm drives the market expansion process in one direction rather
than another. Indeed, it could determine whether of not the merging parties even are
placed in the same market.
Third, and most important, the SMP makes no sense as a matter of policy.19 A finding
that there are no significant competitive concerns in the most narrow possible market
definition does not mean that there are no concerns in a broader market. To illustrate,
consider a proposed merger between Heinz and Beech-Nut. Suppose that the ssnip test
found a narrow market for premium baby food comprised of just Gerber and Beech-Nut,
a narrow market that does not include Heinz. Suppose that it also found another narrow

19

For a similar view, see Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytic Overview, 74 ANTITRUST
LAW JOURNAL 129, 148 (2007).
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market for Gerber and Heinz that does not include Beech-Nut.20 Those two market
definitions do not imply that a merger between Beech-Nut and Heinz necessarily would
be free of significant competitive issues, involving either unilateral or coordinated
effects. That is, there might be competitive problems in a market comprised of all three
brands. For example, suppose that the concern were coordinated effects. A finding that
coordination between Gerber and Beech-Nut likely would not be undone by the fear of
competition from Heinz obviously does not imply that bringing Heinz into the
coordination as a third participant would have little or no incremental effect on the
likelihood of success or the magnitude of the coordinated price increase. With respect to
unilateral effects, a finding that Gerber and Beech-Nut satisfy the ssnip test does not
mean that competition between Beech-Nut and Heinz is so minimal that there could be
little or no significant adverse unilateral effects from a Beech-Nut/Heinz merger.21
Fourth, it is not clear what purpose the SMP serves today. In 1982, there was a concern
about gerrymandered markets, defined using mushy Brown Shoe22 factors, solely in order
to produce high market shares. Therefore, it was suggested, a rigorous and mechanical
algorithm was needed to prevent the gerrymandering. Even if this provided the rationale
for the algorithm in 1982, it does not explain the rationale for the SMP. The
gerrymandering involved overly narrow markets, not overly broad markets.23 And, in
any event, this rationale is no longer relevant even for the algorithm. Merger analysis has
become far more rigorous in the last 27 years, partly from what was learned by the
discipline of the ssnip test. Now that the lesson has been learned, the crutch of the
mechanical algorithm and the SMP is no longer needed.
Both the pen example and this observation about gerrymandered markets make a larger
point about the role of market definition in the merger review process. Market definition
is an either/or bright line decision. Either two products are in the same market or they are
not. There is no continuum of higher and lower likelihood. This is not a problem where
there is a huge break in the chain of substitutes, say in the case of geographic markets for
supermarkets in Wyoming. But, often the chain of substitution does not involve huge
breaks. Moreover, the quantitative estimates of cross-elasticities of demand and own20

This example also makes another point. A particular product can be placed in multiple markets. The
antitrust market definition exercise does not divide up the world into a set of immutable mutually exclusive
markets, in which a particular product can only be placed in a single relevant market.
21

We have heard the argument that the SMP is an anomaly that can be easily handled simply by increasing
the size of the ssnip. We do not think that this is a good solution. Raising the ssnip also may bring in
additional products, so it may lead to an overly broad market. In response, it might be argued that the ssnip
should only be increased when it is discovered that the SMP is leading to an overly narrow market. But,
that response is circular. If it is known that the market is too narrow by the test, then there must be another
better test being used.
22

Brown Shoe Co. v United States, 370 U.S. 294, __ (1962)

23

The algorithm for broadening the market when the ssnip test indicates an unprofitable price increase can
be a useful tool. But, as illustrated with the pen example, following it slavishly can distort the analysis.
And, there also is no reason to be constrained by the tool. If a merger raises competitive concerns in a
market that satisfies the ssnip test of profitability, then it raises concerns. The concerns exist regardless of
whether a particular mechanical path was taken to reach that valid market definition.

10

elasticities of demand are noisy, if they are estimated at all. Other evidence of reasonable
interchangeability also generally is imperfect or ambiguous, and often highly subjective.
In these situations, merger analysis (indeed, all of antitrust) should not place so many
eggs in the market share basket.
B. The Cellophane Fallacy and the “Prevailing Price” Benchmark
It is well known that the standard application of the ssnip test falls victim to a variant of
the Cellophane Fallacy when there is pre-merger tacit or express coordination taking
place. For example, consider a hypothetical merger between the only two airlines serving
a small city located 60 miles from a larger city with a much larger airport . Suppose that
those airlines are able to successfully tacitly coordinate, so that their prices are set just
below the price that would cause travelers to drive to the larger city airport. In that
situation, the relevant market would be found by the ssnip test to include the many flights
originating at the larger city airport. As a result, the market share of the two small
airlines might be so small that their merger would fall into the HHI safe harbor.
If there is highly successful tacit coordination, the actual loss necessarily would exceed
the critical loss because the firms already have achieved the profit-maximizing price.
Indeed, this is precisely how the Cellophane Fallacy was committed in the DuPont
case.24 A standard critical loss analysis would find that a ssnip above the tacitly
coordinated price would be unprofitable, which would imply that the group of products is
not a relevant market under the ssnip test. The market then would be broadened beyond
the tacitly coordinating group.
This analysis raises both a policy issue and a practical issue. The policy issue is whether
or not merger enforcement should “grandfather” pre-merger market power and market
conditions.25 The parties might argue that the airline merger would not have any adverse
incremental effects on consumers – because coordination is easy and the parties are
already successfully tacitly coordinating.
The flaw in the parties’ argument is that economics teaches that tacit coordination often is
neither perfect nor durable. Coordination can break down as market conditions change.
Or, mistakes might be made that set off “pesky” price wars. Coordination also may be
imperfect when information and trust are not perfect. As a result, grandfathering the
current structure can allow coordination to be perfected and can eliminate the potential
for the market outcome to improve. The current Merger Guidelines suggest that
grandfathering is not a blanket policy. The Merger Guidelines state that the prevailing
price will not be used for the ssnip test when “premerger circumstances are strongly
suggestive of coordinated interaction.” §1.11 (emphasis added).

24

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).

25

As noted above, the current Merger Guidelines do not include the goal of preventing the “maintenance”
of market power.

11

The practical issue is the following: what finding would be required to hold that the
evidence is “strongly suggestive.” A history of express collusion is the easy case. But,
what about the scenario of tacit coordination. What is the required evidence? For
example, suppose that high pre-merger margins are earned by firms with excess capacity
selling products that are not highly differentiated. These facts might suggest the
existence of tacit coordination. Should that evidence be sufficient to be called “strongly
suggestive?” Or, would more evidence from the coordination “checklist” be required in
order to draw that conclusion? When firms each produce a single differentiated product,
would prices exceeding Bertrand equilibrium prices raise a sufficiently strong suspicion
of tacit coordination?26 It is not clear what standards and evidence the agencies are
utilizing for this issue. We recommend that the Agencies include this issue on their
Update agenda. Falling victim to the Cellophane Fallacy is not just embarrassing. It is
also bad policy.
There is also an issue of how to determine the relevant market and calculate market
shares when there is evidence of tacit coordination. If the “prevailing price” is not used
for the ssnip test, what price benchmark should be used? One obvious candidate is the
prevailing price minus a ssnip. In that scenario, the ssnip would involve a price increase
up to the current price level. That price increase would be profitable, virtually by
definition since the coordinating group could have chosen a lower price. This means that
the group of products sold by the established competitors would satisfy the profitability
condition for finding a relevant market. The relevant participants thus would be limited
solely to the current producers. The relevant participants would not include
“uncommitted entrants” who would enter only if the price were raised by a ssnip above
the current price. The relevant market shares would be the actual market shares of the
established producers.
C. Differentiated Products
As discussed above with respect to the Cellophane Fallacy, high pre-merger margins can
signal successful tacit coordination. However, there are other explanations for high premerger margins. One standard explanation is differentiated products. As stressed in the
articles by Katz & Shapiro27 and O’Brien & Wickelgren28 (collectively, “KSOW”), high
pre-merger margins also can signal low own-elasticities of demand for the individual
differentiated products.
Of course, if this is the case, then it would be useful to take this information into account
in carrying out the ssnip test. In this regard, KSOW have proposed a methodology that
takes into account the information about demand elasticity contained in the price/cost
26

As discussed below, when multi-product firms sell imperfect substitute products (possibly outside the
relevant market), the analysis is more complicated.

27

Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole Story, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at
49;

28

Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 161 (2003).
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margins of short-run profit-maximizing Bertrand competitors, each of whom sell as a
single product.
This is not to say that the simple form of the KSOW test is perfect for every market
situation where the firms are not coordinating. The simple KSOW test assumes that each
firm produces only a single product and maximizes short-term profits in Bertrand
competition. Applying the test to multi-product firms or to firms that maximize longterm profits requires a somewhat different market definition condition. KSOW have
suggested that the exact form of the test might be changed to take into account alterative
structural assumptions. But, whatever the exact form of the test, it is clear that using all
the available information – on demand substitution, supply-side factors that affect the
residual demand curve, and the nature of the competitive process within the industry
under consideration that affects pricing – makes economic sense. At the same, the fact
that the exact test differs according to structural conditions that may be difficult to
estimate perfectly is another reason why the importance of market definition and market
shares might be downgraded.
This KSOW methodology also raises another key issue. The KSOW methodology tends
to lead to narrower markets than often are found now.29 This raises the question of
whether this is the desired outcome or whether it implies that the ssnip level should be
raised to compensate. Of course, this decision also is bound up with the issue of the
strength of the market share presumption that will be adopted in the Guidelines Update.
And, the decision obviously also is bound up with the deterrence issues raised earlier.
D. Multi-Product Firms
Another determinant of the price/cost margin in a differentiated products market is the set
of products sold by the competing firms. Multi-product firms selling imperfect substitute
products would tend to charge higher prices than single-product firms (ceteris paribus).
Multi-product firms selling complementary products would tend to charge lower prices.
Properly implementing the ssnip test requires an understanding of multi-product market
structure.
1. Substitutes
When a firm sells multiple products that are substitutes, the firm will tend to charge
higher prices. Consider a hypothetical pen manufacturer that sells both premium fountain
pens and premium ballpoint pens. That firm might reason that if it reduces the price of its
fountain pens, most of its additional sales would be gained at the expense of other
premium fountain pen makers, but some would come from its own sales of premium
ballpoint pens. That cannibalization of its own sales would deter it from reducing price
(and incentivize it to raise price), relative to an otherwise identical firm that sold only
premium fountain pens.
29

In fact, coupled with the SMP, it may often be the case that the merging firms would not be placed in the
same relevant market.
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This has important implications for the ssnip test for a possible premium fountain pen
market. Suppose a number of the pen makers actually sell both types of pens. That fact
implies that the prevailing price of premium fountain pens also reflects the impact on
premium ballpoint profits too. But, the Merger Guidelines instruct the merger analyst to
assume that the hypothetical monopolist is “the only present and future producer or seller
of those products in that area.” § 1.0. We interpret that instruction to mean that the
hypothetical monopolist would be selling premium fountain pens only (not both premium
fountain pens and premium ballpoint pens).30 Thus, the prevailing prices chosen by the
multi-product firms might well exceed the profit-maximizing price by a hypothetical
monopolist that sold only premium fountain pens. As a result, the ssnip test is more
likely to find that the premium fountain pen price increase is unprofitable and thus
broaden the market, possibly to include all pens, or possibly to include other writing
implements as well. This might suggest in turn that the proper implementation of the
ssnip test would begin with a price below the pre-merger prevailing price.
An adjustment also must be made to the KSOW test. KSOW use the prevailing margins
to infer (or estimate) the magnitude of the own-price elasticity of demand for pens faced
by each manufacturer. In the model with single-product firms used by KSOW, the ownprice elasticity is simply equal to the inverse of the prevailing margin. However, when
firms sell multiple products that are imperfect substitutes – say, premium fountain pens
and premium ballpoint pens – the inverse of the prevailing margin understates the
magnitude of the own-price elasticity.31 If one does not account for this inference
problem, the KSOW approach would tend to introduce a bias toward finding that a ssnip
(above prevailing prices) would be profitable, and hence a bias toward defining markets
that are too narrow (if one uses prevailing prices as the starting point).32
2. Complements
Analogous issues arise when manufacturers produce complementary products. For
example, suppose that a firm produces and sells two complementary products, (say) pens
and paper, in oligopoly markets. That firm generally will sell its pens at a lower price
30

The current Guidelines also instruct us to implement the hypothetical monopolist test “assuming that the
terms of sale of all other products are held constant.” § 1.0. This also suggests that the hypothetical
monopolist would be selling only fountain pens.
31

The understatement of the own-price elasticity leads to a critical aggregate diversion ratio that is too
low. This can be verified by following the calculations in Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Improving
Critical Loss Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE (February 2008). The bias however can be eliminated by
extending the KSOW approach to a setting with multi-product firms. For further details, see Serge Moresi,
Steven C. Salop & John Woodbury, Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist SSNIP Test With MultiProduct Firms, ANTITRUST SOURCE (February 2008) (hereafter, “MSW”). Note that MSW use
prevailing prices and thus do not account for the Cellophane issue.
32

Thus, if the KSOW test were implemented using prevailing prices, there would be two biases that work
in opposite directions. On the one hand, because prevailing margins are “too high,” the KSOW test would
tend to define a market that is too narrow, because of the inference problem. On the other hand, because
prevailing prices are “too high,” the KSOW test would run the risk of defining a market that is too broad
because of the Cellophane issue.
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than it would if it did not also sell paper, ceteris paribus. This is because a lower price
for pens increases the firm’s sales of paper as well as its sales of pens.33
Now consider the ssnip test for a putative market comprised of pens only. Since the
hypothetical monopolist is assumed to sell pens but not paper, it would have an incentive
to raise the price of pens above the prevailing price because it does take into account the
impact on paper profits. Indeed, if the complementarity is significant, this procedure in
principle could lead to the result of a relevant market comprised solely of the pens sold
by a single firm. This, of course, would not be a very helpful market definition and is
another illustration of the problems raised by the SMP. Accordingly, the Guidelines
Update should clarify whether the ssnip test should be applied to the prevailing prices of
pens – in which case the market definition exercise must account for the fact that the
ssnip test tends to delineate markets that are too narrow – or whether the ssnip test should
use different prices above the prevailing prices.34
3. Conclusions
To summarize, market definition in industries with multi-product firms raises important
issues that need to be addressed in the Guidelines Update. These issues in principle can
be analyzed by extending the framework of the hypothetical monopolist test in various
ways. We list three options in the note.35 However, we want to emphasize the fact that
this issue is one more complexity that makes market definition less exact in practice. It is
one more reason to focus less on market shares and more on other competitive effects
evidence.
E. Price Discrimination Markets
We agree that price discrimination markets often are relevant to understanding the
competitive effects of mergers. This is particularly the case in the sale of individually
negotiated intermediate products. Once the SMP is dropped, then analysts and courts
may feel less tension about there being what might be seen as a broad market for the
product generally and narrower price discrimination markets for particular customers.

33

This is often referred to as the “Cournot Complements” effect.

34

If the ssnip test were implemented using the KSOW approach and prevailing margins, ignoring the
inference problem discussed above would lead the analyst to overstate the magnitude of the own-price
elasticity and thus understate the profitability of a ssnip. Again, the KSOW test based on prevailing prices
would involve two biases that work in opposite directions.
35

In this regard, we see three possible options. First, the ssnip test could use prevailing prices as the
starting point, and assume that the hypothetical monopolist owns the other substitutes or complements, but
does not change the prices of those “outside goods.” Second, it could be assumed that the hypothetical
monopolist owns only the products under consideration, and the ssnip test could use prices that are not
equal to prevailing prices – higher (for complements) or lower (for substitutes). Third, the issue could be
ignored (whereby prevailing prices would be used and the hypothetical monopolist would be assumed not
to sell the other substitutes or complements), and then the market shares could simply be ignored in the
competitive effects analysis.
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(Indeed, this might be a place where the discredited term sub-markets actually may be
useful.)
However, we recognize that this concept of separate markets or submarkets might be
confusing to non-specialists. In this regard, another possible usage would be to define
the broader relevant market and then focus the competitive effects analysis on those
particular customers that would be targeted for higher discriminatory or negotiated prices.
It is never the case that every consumer in a market is harmed or harmed equally by an
anticompetitive merger. The same may be true for mergers in negotiated product
markets. Some customers may be harmed while others may be able to protect
themselves.
This same point applies to the role of “big buyers” in market definition and coordinated
effects analysis. A few big buyers may be sufficient to deter tacit coordination and
thereby protect all the buyers. But, that is not necessarily the case. Sometimes the big
buyers can prevent themselves from being charged higher prices, but smaller customers
still may suffer a price increase.
Indeed, an analogous issue arises in market definition if only a single sized ssnip is
contemplated and analyzed. A small ssnip might be unprofitable because of the loss of
the more “mobile” customers. The additional profits earned from the “captive”
customers may be insufficient to offset the loss of the “mobile” customers. However, a
larger ssnip might be profitable because the additional profits earned from the captive
customers would increase.

IV. Unilateral Competitive Effects
It is clear that the Unilateral Effects section also needs revision. One need go no further
than the garbled description of the impact of a 35% combined market share in the current
Merger Guidelines. §2.211. After this part is revised and clarified, we will mourn the
lost opportunity of reading it to students. What a fabulous example of drafting by a
committee in conflict! But, the offsetting benefit is that students, the courts and others
may actually understand the enforcement intentions of the agencies, including the issue
of whether or not there is a safe harbor or anticompetitive presumption.
We begin with a few comments on repositioning and entry, and then discuss the role of
“price pressure indices” for predicting potential unilateral effects.
A. Repositioning and Entry
The Unilateral Effects section should clarify the role of repositioning and required
evidence to support repositioning claims.36 The 2006 Merger Commentary suggests that
36

The Agencies also might consider a new umbrella descriptive term. Repositioning often involves brand
extensions or the addition of optional new features rather than elimination of the previous product design
and replacement by a different product design.
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repositioning is seldom, if ever, sufficient to eliminate concerns. Coupled with tight
agency standards towards cognizable efficiency benefits, this has led to a longstanding
concern among commentators and practitioners that virtually every differentiated
products merger could be said to raise a significant danger of adverse unilateral effects.
It is important to clarify the Agencies’ enforcement stance.
One possibility is that the perceived resistance to repositioning claims primarily involves
an evidentiary issue. For example, we have consulted on consumer products mergers
where there was substantial evidence of continuous brand extensions and brand
repositioning by numerous competitors in the pre-merger world. In this situation, it
would be hard to resist the notion that post-merger price increases in a product niche
would lead to a high likelihood of responsive brand extension or repositioning by others.
It is possible that the market structure or technology has changed, but absent such
information, a tentative conclusion of “easy repositioning” would seem reasonable.
The likelihood of repositioning may be much less clear if there never had been brand
extensions or other forms of repositioning in the pre-merger world. Under those
conditions, a claim of rapid and easy repositioning might be seen as speculative, absent
supportive evidence from the firms alleged to have potential to reposition.37 Showing
that repositioning would be rapid and impediment-free obviously also would be
important. The burden might be placed on the merging firms to explain why history does
not provide reliable evidence, rather than simply assuming that a history of competition
has never presented a repositioning opportunity. 38
Repositioning by rivals is a type of supply-side response like entry. The same debate
about the role of historical evidence arises with respect to entry. A history of entry in
response to demand growth or other market conditions strongly suggests the potential for
entry in the post-merger market, and it complements the engineering and economic
evidence of timeliness and likelihood. The real question is the opposite implication:
does the lack of entry in the past imply that there likely are significant impediments to
entry to prevent entry from preventing post-merger competitive harm? This is not
necessarily the case. As observed by the court in Waste Management, the lack of entry
could be the result of easy entry: incumbents were deterred from attempting to set supracompetitive prices out of a fear of entry.39
However, this answer is facile and actually implies the need for further analysis.
Otherwise, one could get lost in the conundrum that a history of entry must imply supra37

The credibility of their testimony might be questioned for the usual reasons.

38

We also note that the current Merger Guidelines focus on repositioning by the rivals of the merging
firms. The merged firm also could reposition its product offerings post-merger, a competitive effect that
might be significant in some mergers. We do not know whether it is common for merging firms to claim
they will engage in such efficiency-enhancing repositioning, but it they do, the claim should not be treated
as non-cognizable. However, we note that such repositioning dynamics might be quite complicated to
analyze. For example, see Amit Gandhi, Luke M. Froeb, Steven T. Tschantz & Gregory Werden, PostMerger Product Repositioning, 56 J. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 49 (2008).
39

United States v. Waste Management, Inc. and Allied Waste Industries, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (1984).
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competitive prices and entry barriers, while a lack of entry implies easy entry and
competitive prices. Of course, one path out of the conundrum is the observation that
entry does not occur solely in response to supra-competitive pricing. Entry also may
occur in response to changes in preferences, demand growth, innovation and so on. Thus,
to rebut a record of no entry in (say) a growing or dynamic market, it would be helpful to
see evidence, for example, that the incumbent firms anticipated and responded to market
changes faster than potential entrants. As with many claims, more confident resolution of
the issue requires more substantial factual analysis.
B. Predicting Unilateral Effects With Price Pressure Indices
There are alternative methodologies for gauging the magnitude of potential unilateral
effects, both at the screening stage and in the ultimate inquiry. Economists for years have
used merger simulation models for estimating potential unilateral effects. As mentioned
earlier, articles by Werden, O’Brien & Salop, and Farrell & Shapiro also have proposed
the use of price pressure indices (“PPIs”) to aid this analysis. These methodologies rely
on information about diversion ratios, margins and efficiency benefits. In principle, they
also could include information on supply side responses (such as entry and
repositioning).
In these comments, we will focus on the role of these PPIs in competitive effects
analysis. We do not envision these PPIs as eliminating a role of other evidence for
evaluating potential unilateral effects, including both qualitative evidence and merger
simulation models. However, because of the great interest in price pressure indices in the
QFPCs and the antitrust community, these comments will focus on the indices.
1. The GUPPI
One can conceptualize the unilateral effects of a merger on consumer prices as a conflict
between two opposing forces of upward and downward pricing pressure. The elimination
of competition between the competing products of the merging firms generates upward
pricing pressure. The efficiency benefits generate downward pricing pressure.40
The upward pricing pressure depends on the closeness of competition between the
products of the merging firms, relative to other products inside and outside the relevant
market, the price/cost margins and other factors.41 In particular, the upward pricing
pressure may be mitigated by the existence of other close substitutes and by supply-side
responses (i.e., entry and repositioning). Other long-term or dynamic considerations,
such as network effects and learning by doing also might exacerbate the upward pricing

40

For cost-savings, the downward price pressure involves the nominal price. For quality improvements,
the downward price pressure involves the quality-adjusted price.
41

Measuring the price/cost margin raises all the usual issues about the proper measure of cost. However,
these clearly are not fatal concerns for the UPP or GUPPI. In fact, what is peculiar about criticisms based
on cost measurement concerns is that an estimate of the price/cost margin is required for the ssnip test too.
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pressure.42 The downward pricing pressure from efficiencies may be mitigated by the
various factors that limit the merger-specificity and cognizability of efficiencies.
The balance between the upward and downward pricing pressure determines whether the
merger is likely to raise or lower the prices of the merging firms’ products, ceteris
paribus. Farrell & Shapiro define their UPP measure as a first-round “net” effect
measure, as do O’Brien & Salop with respect to their comparable PPI measure.43
Rather than focus on “net” effects, we take a somewhat different approach here that
clarifies some of the analytic and measurement issues. We define “GUPPI” as the
“Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index.” GUPPI is intended to measure the upward
pricing pressure solely from the closeness of substitution between the products of the
merging firms, before adjusting for the possible mitigating effects of supply side
responses and other factors, and before netting out the downward pricing pressure.
In formal terms, the gross upward pricing pressure (in dollar terms) on the price of the
product produced by merging partner firm-1 as a result of substitution between that
product and the product sold by its merger partner firm-2 is given by:
G1 = DR12 × M 2

(1)

where DR12 is the diversion ratio from product-1 to product-2, M2 is the price/cost margin
of product-2, and x denotes the multiplication (“times”) operator.44 This is what Farrell
& Shapiro refer to as the “cannibalization effect.” For example, if DR12=20% and
M2=$50, then G1=$10. The gross upward pricing pressure for product-2 (in dollar terms)
is defined similarly as G2 = DR21 x M1.
Intuitively, the gross upward pricing pressure (G) is the “value of the diversion” to the
merging partner. That value is higher when either the diversion ratio is higher, or the
price/cost margin of the merging partner is higher (or both). In fact, it is the relevant
measure of closeness of substitution in the current Merger Guidelines.45 That is, the
gross upward pricing pressure also is used to rank the next-best substitutes during the
market definition exercise.
42

See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic
Alternative to Market definition, Working Paper (25 November 2008), at 28.
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Farrell & Shapiro and O’Brien & Salop do not account for the mitigating effects of potential supply-side
responses (i.e., entry and repositioning). In addition, these analyses assume that firms behave according to
static Bertrand competition. If one assumed instead that firms expect other firms to respond to their pricing
initiatives. These considerations make the analysis more complex, as noted by Farrell & Shapiro, Id. at 14.
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We follow Farrell & Shapiro and assume that the merging firms are single-product firms. “We leave for
future work how to formally test for UPP for Product 1 in situations where Firm A owns multiple products
that interact on the demand side. While the basic intuition about opportunity cost is robust, this case is
considerably more technically complex than the one discussed in this paper.” Id. at 27(n. 76).
45

§1.11(n. 9)(“Throughout the Guidelines, the term "next best substitute" refers to the alternative which, if
available in unlimited quantities at constant prices, would account for the greatest value of diversion of
demand in response to a "small but significant and nontransitory" price increase.” (emphasis added)
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The gross upward pricing pressure also can be defined using the “percentage margin”
instead of the “dollar margin.” This leads to an index that could be used by the Agencies
as an initial screen for unilateral effects, as we will discuss shortly. We thus refer to it as
the “gross upward price pressure index” or “GUPPI” for short:
GUPPI1 = DR12 × m2

(2)

where DR12 is the diversion ratio from product-1 to product-2 and m2 is the percentage
margin of product-2. This is essentially the “cannibalization tax” on product-1 expressed
as a percentage of the price of product-2. For example, if DR12=20% and m2=50%, then
GUPPI1=10%. The GUPPI for product-2 is defined similarly as GUPPI2 = DR21 x m1.46
The GUPPI does not purport to be equal to the merger-induced equilibrium price
increase. It is merely an index of the upward pricing incentive of the merged firm for
each of its overlap products, holding the prices of other products at pre-merger levels and
ignoring other factors. (Under certain conditions, however, and ignoring other factors
discussed below, the GUPPI can be used to obtain a precise measure of the predicted
“first-round” price increase.47)
The GUPPI does not account for other factors that affect the upward pricing pressure.
Nor does it account for the downward pricing pressure caused by efficiencies. That is
why it is called the “gross” upward price pressure index. However, it is worth focusing
on GUPPI because it is the easiest factor to measure simply and quickly. Therefore, it is
a good candidate for an initial screen. However, before discussing the issues related to its
use as an initial screen or as setting the anticompetitive presumption, we want to start
with its potential role as relevant evidence of unilateral effects.
The GUPPI is relevant “circumstantial” evidence of adverse unilateral effects. The
GUPPI generally has been used by economists in this way. But, it is only one factor
among others. These other factors also may be very important. First, the simple GUPPI
formula does not take into account merger-specific efficiencies, such as production cost
savings and product quality increases. Second, the GUPPI does not account for several
other factors that are potentially important, including supply-side responses (i.e., product
repositioning, uncommitted entry and committed entry), the closeness of other
substitutes, the multi-product nature of many firms (i.e., the impact on pricing incentives
of the merged firm’s sales of other substitutable or complementary products), potential
pricing interdependencies (i.e., how the merging firm’s pricing initiatives might trigger
46

The GUPPI measure and the UPP test normally are derived and analyzed in the context of the Bertrand
model of price competition with differentiated products. However, similar measures also can be derived in
the context of the Cournot model of quantity competition. For details, see the Comment of Serge Moresi
on this issue submitted separately in response to the QFPCs.
47

For linear demand, the first-round percentage price increase of product-1 would be equal to the GUPPI1
divided by 2 and then multiplied by the pre-merger price ratio P2/P1. For constant elasticity, the first-round
percentage price increase of product-1 would be equal to the GUPPI1 divided by (1-m1) and then multiplied
by the pre-merger price ratio P2/P1.
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particular responses by other firms), dynamic demand factors, and the shape of the
demand curve (i.e., the magnitude of the price effect depends on the curvature of the
demand function). Thus, as relevant evidence, the GUPPI would be combined with other
evidence to form a better prediction.
As we discuss below, more complex PPIs in principle can be explicitly formulated to
account for efficiencies and some or all of these other factors, but this step raises more
difficult evidentiary issues at the screening stage. The more complex formulations also
raise quantification issues, that is, the ability to quantify the factors and in a way that
allows them to be inserted into a formula, as opposed to taking them into account in a
more qualitative way.
Finally, we also want to stress that the use of a measure like GUPPI does not necessarily
obviate the analysis of the issues normally evaluated in the market definition exercise. In
fact, as indicated above, the GUPPI is the measure of closeness of substitution used in
the ssnip test for determining the next-best substitute product. The GUPPI also is a close
cousin of the KSOW market definition methodology discussed above.48 These
connections serve as an important reminder that market definition analysis also focuses
on closeness of substitutes, just as does the GUPPI’s diversion ratio.49 The diversion
ratio is related to the cross-elasticity and own-elasticity of demand. The importance of
the cross-elasticity of demand has been used in market definition going back to the
DuPont decision. The own-elasticity for a group of products forms the backbone of the
ssnip test.
2. Using of GUPPI for Determining Presumptions Regarding
Unilateral Effects
In Section II of these comments, we discussed generally the role of presumptions in
merger enforcement and merger law. The GUPPI also might be used for setting
enforcements thresholds. For example, a relatively low GUPPI threshold could be used
to establish a safe harbor for presumptively non-harmful transactions. A relatively high
GUPPI threshold could be used to identify presumptively anticompetitive transactions.
That is, the GUPPI could be used to replace or supplement the HHI thresholds in the
Merger Guidelines. We believe that most economists would agree that the GUPPI
generally is a better gauge of unilateral effects concerns than the HHI delta.50 The
48

Suppose for simplicity that the two merging firms earn the same margin, m, and have the same diversion
ratio, DR, between each other. Using the KSOW test, a ssnip by the two merging products would be
profitable if GUPPI > s*m/(s+m), where s is the ssnip (e.g., 10%). Note that the Merger Guidelines’ focus
on profit-maximizing behavior means that the analyst would use the KSOW test with s=10% in order to test
whether the two merging firms would have an incentive to raise price by 5%.
49

Indeed, it is common for merger analysts to combine market definition and the GUPPI as part of their
preliminary analysis. This involves basing diversion ratios on the concept of “proportional diversion,” that
diversion is in proportion to the market shares of the firms in a relevant market, along with analysis that
takes into account diversion to products outside the relevant market.
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In the Cournot model, the weighted average price/cost margin is proportional to the HHI, though the
HHI delta (based on pre-merger market shares) loses its relevance. We note that for one particular
negotiation market situation, the HHI delta is a direct measure of the unilateral effects of a merger among
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GUPPI could be used alone, or it might be supplemented with the combined market share
of the merging parties in a well-defined market.
The best methodology also might vary according to the stage of the merger enforcement
process. For example, if it is fairly clear that the GUPPI is below a safe harbor level,
then the Agency might decide not to issue a second request based on unilateral effects
concerns. (This is the same way in which HHI<1000 is used in the 1992 Merger
Guidelines, for those matters where the market definition is obvious.)
Later on in the HSR process, the Agencies could use the GUPPI to determine whether or
not the merger should be treated as presumptively anticompetitive.51 If the GUPPI
exceeds this level, the burden might shift to the parties to rebut the presumption with
other evidence. There similarly may be a low GUPPI level where there is a strong
presumption that the merger does not raise unilateral effects concerns. (This level would
not necessarily be the same as the safe harbor level used previously to determine whether
or not to issue a second request.52)
One could imagine a sliding scale type of analysis for different values of GUPPI later on
in the HSR process. For example, there could be three levels in all.53 First, for very low
GUPPI levels, there might be a strong (irrebuttable or rebuttable) presumption that there
are no unilateral effects concerns. Second, there might be a higher GUPPI level, where
the Agencies conclude that the presumed likelihood of harm is high, but not high enough
to shift the rebuttal burden to the parties. Instead, that level may be seen more as a
statement of information -- that this GUPPI level ordinarily raises significant concerns
and will require more evidence to alter that expectation. But, the Agencies might
continue to bear the burden of supporting or rebutting that concern. Third, if the GUPPI
is sufficiently higher, then the burden might shift to the merging parties to rebut the
presumption.54 (The burden of persuasion issue is often an issue of great contention in
alternative negotiation partners. For details, see the Comment of Yianis Sarafidis on this issue submitted in
response to the QFPCs. See also Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop & Yianis Sarafidis, A Model of Ordered
Bargaining with Applications, working paper (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287224.
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At this later stage, the Agencies might want to backstop the GUPPI with market share information. We
are not making a recommendation here regarding the precise methodology. We are just suggesting that
these alternatives be considered as part of the Update process.
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The levels would be different because the precision of the GUPPI estimate likely would improve on the
basis of additional information gathered from the second request.
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To illustrate with arbitrary HHI numbers, an HHI<1800 might be considered presumptively competitive;
HHI>2400 might be the point where concerns become very significant but the agencies retain the burden of
persuasion; HH>3000 is the point where the burden shifts to the parties to rebut the presumption.
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A useful analogy might be to medical tests. At one end, the physician might conclude that a patient’s
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HSR practice, so it would be beneficial to clarify the Agencies’ intentions in the Update.)
There also is the question of whether the simple GUPPI formula should be used, or
whether the GUPPI should be replaced by a PPI that explicitly takes into account some
or all of the other factors. (For example, Farrell & Shapiro’s UPP takes into account an
“efficiency credit.”) We would not recommend this type of reformulation. There are too
many possible factors to include. Moreover, some of the factors are not so easily
quantified or cannot be easily inserted into the formula in a simple way. Finally, each of
the factors raises evidentiary burdens. If they were included in the expanded formula,
then the formula might well lose its utility as a simple, initial screening device, say for
deciding whether or not to issue a second request.55 We prefer the simple GUPPI
formula, with the other factors then added into the analysis.
This suggestion does not mean that we think that the other factors are irrelevant. To the
contrary, in the ultimate merits analysis, more complex analyses often will be quite
useful, including the UPP or other variants that take the specific structure of the market
into account. In fact, these other factors sometimes may be the central issues in the
ultimate merits analysis. This analysis also would include evidence specific to the
merger, rather than just presumptive credits and adjustments like the efficiency credit.
But, we would recommend that the presumption be based on the GUPPI, rather than a
more complex formula. We feel this is a compromise worth considering in the Update.
If the GUPPI were given this role as a presumption, the Agencies would need to set the
thresholds and the strength of the presumption. As suggested by the long list of factors
above, setting the threshold would involve more than simply applying an “efficiency
credit” (whether based on an estimate of the typical variable cost-reduction in horizontal
mergers, either in general or tailored to particular industries). (We discuss the efficiency
credit in more detail in Section VI below.) The other factors also would need to be
reckoned into the evaluation of the presumption. It also would be necessary to take into
account deterrence concerns of the type discussed above in Section II. While the DOJ
never fully explained their reasoning, the DOJ may have engaged in some type of similar
analytic exercise in setting the HHI thresholds in the 1982 Merger Guidelines, perhaps
based on the agency’s experience in merger analysis. Of course, elections matter and
William Baxter’s general antitrust experience and his beliefs about the costs and benefits
of merger enforcement obviously also played a role.
If GUPPI (whether alone or in conjunction with the combined market share) is used to
identify presumptively non-harmful or presumptively anticompetitive transactions for
enforcement purposes, the Agencies must choose whether to make those presumptions
rebuttable or irrebuttable. If one or the other presumption is rebuttable, the Agencies also
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Of course, some well-counseled firms likely will present evidence on these other factors at an early stage
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very expensive for the parties, causes delay and uses up substantial resources of both the Agency and the
parties.
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must choose the strength of the presumption – that is, the weight of the “thumb on the
scale.” Again, this is the way in which the HHI is used in the current Merger Guidelines.
We recommend that for the purposes of identifying presumptively anticompetitive
transactions, the Agencies use some type of sliding scale. A higher GUPPI should
require more exculpatory evidence than would a smaller GUPPI. (A sliding scale also
should apply if other more complex PPIs were used to supplement the analysis.)
In light of the importance of these other factors, we recommend that the presumption not
be irrebuttable. We similarly recommend that the presumption of anticompetitive effects
be modest, except perhaps for the most extreme values. And, even then, rebuttal should
be permitted.
V.

Coordinated Effects

In these comments, we will only make a few limited observations about coordinated
effects analysis.
First, a key issue is the determination of how the proposed merger will maintain or
increase the likelihood of successful tacit coordination. However, the Merger Guidelines
say very little about the incremental impact of the merger on the likelihood of present and
future coordination, as opposed simply to the impact of the pre-merger market structure.
More attention should be paid to the incremental impact, including the issue of
maintenance of a high likelihood of coordination in the future.56
Second, the coordination “checklist” of coordination hindering and facilitating factors
does not prioritize the various items. Nor does it take a critical approach to them, for
example, by explaining their limitations. This would be a useful addition, both for the
parties and the courts.
Third, every market involves some hindering and some facilitating factors.” In
evaluating a merger (say, with a high HHI) against claims that it will lead to likely
coordinated effects, the relevant issue would be the level of those factors, relative to a
typical merger with that HHI level. Yet, the Merger Guidelines provide no guidance on
the typical levels of these factors. This issue was noted by the courts in HCA57 and
Heinz.58
VI. Efficiencies
We have a few comments on the analysis of efficiencies.
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For example, see Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Effects
Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY L.R. 135 (2002).
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A. Efficiencies Presumption, Generally
Merger law and the Merger Guidelines in principle include two categories of efficiency
benefits. First, there are the cognizable efficiency benefits analyzed in §4 of the Merger
Guidelines. Second, there are presumptive efficiency benefits credited to every merger.
These include the general benefits to society from permitting the transfer of assets from
one party to another that places a higher value on those assets. They also include the
benefits that while real, might be impossible to substantiate and verify during the premerger process or that might otherwise not be viewed as cognizable because they likely
would not be shared with consumers.
Since the 1997 Efficiencies Revision to the Merger Guidelines, there has been some
economic research claiming that the efficiency benefits often claimed for mergers are
overstated. For example, as summarized in the recent article of Baker & Shapiro,59
There is considerable evidence, moreover, that acquiring firms are
systematically overoptimistic about the efficiencies they can achieve
through acquisition. Evidence from the finance, managerial, and
economics literatures show that many mergers do not work out well, either
in terms of shareholder value or organizationally. This evidence supports
the view that many mergers are motivated by managerial hubris, perhaps
exacerbated by distorted managerial compensation schemes, and that
managers often underestimate integration problems. This evidence
certainly does not support the view that merger-specific efficiencies are
common or that claims of efficiencies made by merging parties should
generally be credited. Some mergers are undoubtedly motivated by the
pursuit of genuine efficiencies and go on to generate them. But we caution
that arguments by merging firms that efficiencies will enhance their ability
and incentive to compete, resulting in lower prices, higher quality or new
products, should not be accepted based solely on their plausibility, but
only after careful analysis.
It seems clear that the Agencies must review this evidence to evaluate how, if at
all, it should alter the permissiveness of merger enforcement policy and the
GUPPI and/or HHI thresholds.
B. The Efficiency Credit for Unilateral Effects
One of the other factors discussed above with respect to using the GUPPI (either as
relevant evidence or for setting the presumptions) is the evaluation is the level of
expected efficiencies, what Farrell and Shapiro call the “efficiency credit.” Purely for
illustrative purposes, Farrell and Shapiro used an efficiency credit of 10%.60 In their
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formulation, when the GUPPI is used as relevant evidence, and in the absence of
evidence on the cognizable efficiencies from the merger, the Agencies would apply a
“standard deduction.” However, the merging parties instead could provide evidence of a
large cognizable cost-savings, what Farrell & Shapiro refer to as an “itemized deduction.”
There are several issues to note here.
First, Farrell & Shapiro give the parties a choice between the “standard deduction” and
itemizing the cognizable efficiencies. Farrell & Shapiro do not make any adjustment to
account for non-cognizable efficiencies. Nor do they make explicit adjustment for
optimal deterrence in their analysis. In our view, both those adjustments should be made
for the reasons discussed above. Deterrence and general efficiencies concerns also would
have to be included somehow in the standard deduction. But, that would mean that
parties who opt for itemizing cognizable efficiencies potentially would lose those
adjustments. To correct this problem, the Agencies should consider crediting the parties
for the general efficiencies and optimal deterrence factors, whether or not they opt for
itemizing the cognizable efficiencies.61
Second, Farrell & Shapiro formulate the efficiency credit as a fraction of the variable
costs of the merging firms. This is not an innocuous choice. It means that the credit
declines in importance as the price/cost margin rises. For example, consider a product
with zero variable costs; it would obtain no efficiency credit. This might be a reasonable
choice if all efficiency benefits involved cost reductions. But, efficiency benefits may
involve quality improvements too. Quality improvements often increase consumers’
willingness to pay for the product, and thus can be measured as a percentage of the price
of the product. However, it is more complicated than that because the merged firm might
have the incentive to raise its nominal price by the amount of the quality increase in order
to maintain a constant quality-adjusted price.62 In that situation, consumer surplus may
increase, even if the quality-adjusted price does not change.63 In fact, an increase in
product quality may lead to higher consumer welfare even if the quality-adjusted price
increases. This analysis raises the caution that a reformulation of the UPP test in terms
of “upward quality-adjusted price pressure” could be potentially misleading because a
higher quality-adjusted price does not necessarily imply consumer harm.
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We have been working on this issue, though our work remains unpublished. In that regard, consider a
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Subject to that caution, these observations suggest that the efficiency credit might be set
as a fraction of price (not cost) for industries where mergers are likely to generate quality
improvements. It also suggests the efficiency credit might have two parts, one relating to
cost-savings and another relating to quality-improvements.
Third, to repeat the discussion in the previous section, the analysis should not be limited
solely to a narrowly defined efficiency credit. The impact of the other market factors and
deterrence concerns also should be taken into account in setting the GUPPI presumption
thresholds (both the “safe harbor” and the “presumptively anticompetitive” thresholds.)
C. Anticompetitive Efficiency Claims
There is a historical antitrust concern that efficiencies may have anticompetitive effects.
It sometimes used to be argued that the dominant “price leader” with significantly lower
cost could threaten to “discipline” smaller rivals that tried to challenge its dominance by
competing harder. This disciplining behavior would involve setting off a price war that
would drive its smaller, higher cost rivals into a below-cost position but would continue
to earn a positive profit for itself. In Brown Shoe, efficiencies were seen potentially as
part of the antitrust “offense” rather than being a “defense” to claims that the merger
would harm consumers.
These same concerns in principle also can arise in the modern competitive effects
analysis of the Merger Guidelines. In the context of coordinated effects, if a merger leads
the merged firm to reduce its costs, such cost reductions could increase the likelihood of
a successful coordinated outcome. The reasoning is that non-merging maverick firms
might fear that a lower cost merged firm would have greater ability and incentive to
retaliate (and retaliate harder) against maverick rivals’ price cuts. This increased ability
in turn could deter such maverick price cuts and thereby increase the likelihood of the
coordinated outcome. This is simply a modern, game-theoretic rendering of the old
“disciplining” story.
A variant of this concern applied to oligopoly interaction actually was alleged in the
DOJ’s Competitive Impact Statement for the Premdor/Masonite merger.64 The DOJ
apparently was concerned that by creating a vertically integrated firm with lower costs,
the merger would facilitate coordination with the leading firm, which also was vertically
integrated. The DOJ stated this concern about cost-reductions reducing the incentives to
cut price as follows: “In fact, Masonite recognized that the [rival] firm's incentive to gain
market share by lowering price would diminish if it faced a strong, integrated
competitor.”65
Of course, this issue is complicated. It would matter whether the cost reductions are
obtained by the “maverick” or by a “cartel enforcer.” On the one hand, it would be
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procompetitive for a "maverick" to get lower costs, because lowered costs enhance its
incentive to cheat on the coordinated agreement. On the other hand, it would be
potentially anticompetitive for a "cartel enforcer" to get lower costs because its lowered
costs increase the likelihood and severity of its retaliation against price cuts by the
maverick. (For these purposes, the “cartel enforcer” may refer to all the non-maverick
firms or just the single firm most likely to detect and take action against a defecting
maverick.) And, of course, this analysis is not limited to explicit cartels but applies to
tacit coordination as well.66
Cost reductions also can reduce the likelihood that fear of entry would constrain postmerger prices. This is because lower cost incumbents would increase the intensity of
post-entry competition. The fear of heightened post-entry competition can act as an entry
deterrent.67
We certainly are not suggesting that antitrust return to those yesteryear days of Brown
Shoe or Procter and Gamble.68 We are suggesting, however, that the Guidelines Update
might address this issue. In principle, there are at least three alternative approaches that
might be taken. First, the Agencies might conclude that these anticompetitive effects are
sufficiently unlikely that these concerns should be viewed as irrebuttably non-cognizable,
and suggest that courts do the same. Second, the Agencies might conclude that there
should be a strong but rebuttable presumption that efficiencies are procompetitive, and
the plaintiff would have a heavy burden of proof to establish the likelihood of the
anticompetitive effect with a substantial degree of certainty. Third the Agencies might
conclude that anticompetitive efficiencies represent a significant concern that warrants
detailed analysis in every matter and/or that efficiencies should be further discounted as a
result. We would not recommend the latter approach.
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